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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-2558 
 ___________ 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ORUSTU B. BROWN, a/k/a TJ 
 
                              ORUSTU B. BROWN,  
  Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 02-cr-00236-001) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 19, 2012 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: December 6, 2012) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Orustu B. Brown appeals pro se from the District Court’s orders denying his 
motions for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and for reconsideration of 
that ruling.  We will affirm. 
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I. 
 In 2002, Brown pleaded guilty to one charge of possession with intent to distribute 
five grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2002 version).  The 10.8 grams of crack cocaine at issue produced a base 
Sentencing Guidelines offense level of 26.  Because Brown is a career offender, however, 
his offense level increased to 34.  Following a three-point downward adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility, Brown’s offense level of 31 and his criminal history 
category of VI produced a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months of imprisonment.  The 
District Court sentenced him to 188 months. 
 At issue here is Brown’s motion for a reduction in sentence under § 3582(c)(2).  In 
his motion, Brown sought a reduction in light of Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 750, 
which “reduced the crack-related offense levels in § 2D1.1 of the Guidelines.”  United 
States v. Berberena, Nos. 11-4540 & 12-1103, — F.3d —, 2012 WL 3937666, at *1 (3d 
Cir. Sept. 11, 2012).  Brown did not request any specific reduction or explain how he 
believed Amendment 750 affected his Guidelines range.  By order entered April 30, 
2012, the District Court denied the motion without explanation.  Brown then filed a 
motion for reconsideration repeating his request for an unspecified reduction and raising 
for the first time the arguments addressed below.  The District Court denied that motion 
by order entered May 14, 2012.  In doing so, the District Court explained that application 
of Amendment 750 would not change Brown’s sentencing range because, although it 
would reduce his base offense level from 26 to 18, his total offense level would remain 
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31 because of his status as a career offender, and his sentencing range would thus remain 
188 to 235 months of imprisonment even if Amendment 750 were applied.  Brown 
appeals pro se.1
II. 
 
 Brown’s request for a sentence reduction is squarely foreclosed by our existing 
precedent.  A sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is available only if, inter alia, the 
defendant was “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has 
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission[.]”  § 3582(c)(2); see also 
United States v. Thompson, 682 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 2012).  As we held before Brown 
filed his motion, this language permits a reduction on the basis of a Guidelines 
amendment only if the amendment “ha[s] the effect of lowering the sentencing range 
actually used at sentencing.”  United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quotation marks omitted).  The amendment at issue in Mateo did not do so because the 
defendant’s offense level was determined by his career offender status, not by the lower 
base offense level dictated by crack cocaine quantity, and his sentencing range thus 
remained the same even with application of the amendment.  See id.
                                                 
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s denial of 
a § 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion, though we review underlying legal issues 
de novo.  See Berberena, 2012 WL 3937666, at *3 n.7.  We review the denial of 
reconsideration for abuse of discretion as well.  See United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 
724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 at 154-55.  The same 
is true in this case.  Indeed, Brown’s sentencing range of 188 to 235 months of 
 
4 
 
imprisonment, which is unchanged by application of Amendment 750, is the exact same 
sentencing range that was left unchanged by application of the amendment at issue in 
Mateo.  See id. at 155.  We recently reaffirmed our holding in Mateo after concluding 
that it is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Freeman v. United States, 131 
S. Ct. 2685 (2011).  See Thompson
 Brown has not acknowledged this controlling authority.  Instead, he repeats the 
arguments that he raised for the first time in his motion for reconsideration.  We could 
deem them waived because Brown did not raise them in his underlying motion, 
, 682 F.2d at 291.  Thus, Brown’s request for a 
sentence reduction on the basis of Amendment 750 is clearly foreclosed. 
see 
Dupree, 617 F.3d at 732-33, but they lack merit in any event.  Brown argues that the 
Sentencing Commission violated the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and 
principles of due process in promulgating Guidelines commentary that precludes career 
offenders from benefitting from Amendment 750.  We have considered these arguments, 
and find them unpersuasive.  Brown also argues that depriving career offenders of the 
benefit of Amendment 750 is inconsistent with the legislative intent underlying the Fair 
Sentencing Act and the policies underlying the crack cocaine amendments in general.  
These arguments are contrary to the plain statutory language of § 3582(c)(2).  See 
Berberena, 2012 WL 3937666, at *4 (rejecting similar arguments because “[w]e cannot 
intuit an intent unmoored from Congress’ directives”).  Finally, Brown argues that the 
District Court retained the discretion to reduce his sentence because the Guidelines are 
advisory.  We squarely rejected that argument in Mateo because, while the Guidelines 
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may be advisory, the language of § 3582(c)(2) is not and expressly limits district courts’ 
authority to reduce sentences to situations in which the Sentencing Commission has 
lowered the applicable Guidelines range.  See Mateo
  For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
, 560 F.3d at 155-56.  Brown is not 
in that situation because the crack-quantity Guideline from whose amendment he seeks to 
benefit played no role in determining his sentence. 
